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I. INTRODUCTION
The “butterfly effect,” one of the fundamental principles of chaos theory,
postulates that small changes in complex systems can lead to massive and, at
1
times, catastrophic results. Scientists studying chaos theory grapple with the
2
multitude of problems arising from vast systemic complexity. The study of
chaotic systems presents the challenge of predicting inherently unpredictable
3
phenomena. This amorphous scientific discipline has emerged from efforts to
4
analyze entities like global economies, weather systems, and brain states. The
challenge of finding patterns in these systems, however, seems relatively simple
when compared with the immense difficulty of implementing predictable
5
changes in them.
The global climate is a prime example of a system to which the principles of
6
chaos theory apply. A litany of factors including the Earth’s obliquity, ocean
currents, massive polar ice sheets, and greenhouse gases affect weather patterns
7
across the globe. These factors are profoundly interconnected, and small changes
in any single variable can create massive fluctuations in all the others that
8
combine to affect global weather systems in myriad ways. Chaos theory
principles add depth to the challenge of creating environmental legislation; not
only do legislators—the group currently responsible for crafting climate change
policy in the United States—have to grapple with scientific issues which fall
outside their areas of expertise, but any legislative change they make has the
9
potential to set off new and unforeseeable global effects.
While the interconnectivity of environmental variables creates an opaque
10
picture, climatic trends have become increasingly clear in recent decades. The
1. What is Chaos Theory?, FRACTAL FOUNDATION (Nov. 3, 2014), http://fractalfoundation.
org/resources/what-is-chaos-theory/ [hereinafter FRACTAL FOUNDATION] (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
2. Arie Uittenbogaard, Chaos Theory for Beginners: An Introduction, ABARIM PUBLICATIONS, http://www.
abarim-publications.com/ChaosTheoryIntroduction.html#.VDH0vCtdUro (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
3. See John Matson, Chaos Theory Simplified: Just Follow the Bouncing Droplet, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chaos-theory-simplified-droplet/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (giving an overview of the basics of chaos theory).
4. FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1.
5. See id. (discussing the challenges of complex systems).
6. See Uittenbogaard, supra note 2 (stating that the Chaos Theory “dawn[ed] on people” after the study of
a weather model).
7. See generally MYLES R. ALLEN ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 3–8 (The Core
Writing Team et al. eds., 2015), available at https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_
AR5_FINAL_full.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the current changes in
global climate and the various factors that contribute to climate change).
8. See FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the connections between climate factors).
9. See Uittenbogaard, supra note 2 (discussing the ramifications of chaos theory on the behavior of
complex systems like the environment).
10. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2 (discussing observations of a clear warming trend).
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) released its fifth Assessment
Report in 2014, which “provides a clear and up to date view of the current state
11
of scientific knowledge relevant to climate change.” The report goes well
beyond acknowledging that global warming is occurring and that humans cause
it; it asserts that continued global inaction will lead to severe, irreversible
12
effects. According to the report, the leading cause of climate change is
13
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
Faced with the increasingly ominous specter of climate change, the effort to
implement environmental policy on a national level in the United States
14
continues to lack coherency. The inability of Congress to adopt a cohesive
approach to the problem of climate change stems from an inability to agree not
15
just on the best way to attack the issue, but on whether the issue exists at all.
This failure to recognize the significance of the issue substantially hinders efforts
16
to tackle it. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers federal
17
environmental regulation. The Clean Air Act empowered the EPA to regulate
the emission of airborne pollutants nationwide in response to widespread air
18
quality deterioration in the 1970s. After multiple frustrated attempts by
politicians to implement meaningful legislation to regulate carbon emissions, the
EPA declared greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, to be pollutants under
the Clean Air Act and asserted its power to regulate these gases under that pre19
existing law. However, the Supreme Court limited the EPA’s power to regulate
carbon emitters in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection
20
Agency, ensuring that the need for additional congressional action remains as
21
acute as ever despite the positive impact of the EPA’s new regulatory power.

11. Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.
13. See id. at 3 (stating that the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is “extremely likely
to have been the dominant cause of [global] warming since the mid-20th century”).
14. Legislation in the 112th Congress Related to Global Climate Change, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/112 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
15. Jeff Spross & Ryan Koronowski, The Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus: 113th Congress Edition,
CLIMATEPROGRESS (June 26, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/06/26/2202141/antiscience-climate-denier-caucus-113th-congress-edition/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. See generally id. (discussing congressional failure to recognize the importance of anthropogenic
climate change).
17. Our Mission and What We Do, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/
aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
18. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
19. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2431 (2014) (discussing the
EPA’s implementation of greenhouse gas regulations).
20. Id. at 2431–32.
21. See generally id. (refusing to grant the EPA carte blanche authority to regulate carbon emissions).
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The “glacial” nature of Congress effectively ensures governmental stability,
but poses a serious challenge when attempting to regulate systems governed by
22
principles of chaos theory. The United States faced a similar problem when
confronted with seemingly interminable economic volatility in the decades that
23
followed the Civil War. After a series of reactive measures from Congress and
other organs of government, and increasing instability through the peak of the
Industrial Revolution, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in order to
delegate the task of managing a chaotic system to a flexible panel of experts in
24
the field. Since then, the Federal Reserve Act has empowered the Federal
Reserve to react to the inevitable fluctuations in a chaotic system like the
25
economy with real-time shifts in monetary policy. The Federal Reserve
26
represents a model that could work for the environment as well as the economy.
Empaneling experts to address complex scientific issues and empowering them to
flexibly and powerfully react to the fluid circumstances characteristic of chaotic
systems provides a solution suitable for the challenges presented by climate
27
change.
The economic panics of the second half of the 19th century and the economic
volatility of the Industrial Revolution posed serious risks to the stability of the
28
United States However, because climate change poses an imminent threat of
irreversible damage to the global environment, it represents a broader and more
29
calamitous challenge. Given the growing importance of global climate change,
as well as the complex nature of it, the EPA should be restructured and given
more power in order to control carbon emissions in the United States in the same
way that the Federal Reserve controls monetary policy.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of modern environmental
30
policy in the United States. Part III explains the Federal Reserve’s success in
31
adapting to the challenges presented by chaos theory in the economic arena.
Part IV examines how the Federal Reserve can serve as a model for a reorganized
and reinvigorated EPA and suggests that Congress should empower the EPA to

22. Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY,
http://www.icleiusa.org/blog/glacial-pacing-in-the-halls-of-congress (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
23. History of the Federal Reserve, FEDERAL RESERVE EDUCATION, http://www.federalreserveeducation.
org/about-the-fed/history/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review Law Review).
24. Id.; Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 2, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
25. Federal Reserve Act, § 13.
26. See infra Part IV (arguing that the EPA’s authority should be modeled similarly to the Federal
Reserve’s authority).
27. See History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (discussing the success of the Federal Reserve); see
also FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the challenges of chaos theory).
28. History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23.
29. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7 (discussing the pending irreversible effects of climate change).
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part III.
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react to new environmental crises, including the current struggle with
32
anthropogenic climate change, in a flexible and impactful way.
II. MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
This section will discuss the creation of the EPA, the reforms implemented in
the Clean Air Act, the regulatory powers vested in the EPA in the aftermath of
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, and the current environmental legislation
33
Congress is considering.
A. The Birth of the EPA: The National Environmental Policy Act
34

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which established the
EPA, has been described as “the most important piece of environmental
35
legislation in our history.” NEPA represented the beginning of a new era of
federal policy reflecting a revolutionary prioritization of environmental
36
protection. The 1960s saw an increasingly concerned public rally around the
environmentalist banner, driven by growing fear of environmental deterioration,
the wild popularity of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and widespread
37
disillusionment created by the Vietnam War. The increasing public sentiment in
favor of serious environmental protection culminated in 1970 with NEPA’s
38
passage.
The law’s passage empowered the new administrative agency to engage in a
39
multitude of activities promoting a healthy environment. The EPA’s mission
statement encompassed creating and enforcing new environmental standards,
acting as a leader in environmental research, reinforcing the pro-environmental
efforts of other groups, and playing a key role in the executive branch’s
40
development of environmental policy. However, despite the far-reaching
responsibilities given to the EPA, Congress tasked the organization with more
41
than simply increasing environmental regulation. The passage of NEPA
represented a fundamental change in perspective on managing the environment,

32. Infra Part IV.
33. Infra Part II.A–C.
34. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, § 2, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
35. Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Nov. 1985), http://www.
2epa.gov/aboutepa/birth-epa (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 7–8.
38. Id.
39. National Environmental Policy Act § 101.
40. Lewis, supra note 35.
41. See id. (discussing the role of the EPA as being more than simply regulatory).
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ending the piecemeal approach to pollution regulation and creating a new,
42
holistic approach to attacking the problem of pollution.
B. Smiting the Smog in the Sky: The Clean Air Act
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA) on New Year’s Eve in 1970—
43
364 days after the President signed NEPA into law. While NEPA embodied a
broad mission statement describing a new policy of holistic environmental
protection, Congress tailored the CAA to reverse the rapid deterioration of air
44
quality in the United States. The passage of the CAA targeted automobile
emissions in particular, in addition to establishing new Ambient Air Quality
Standards and requiring state plans for achieving them and increasing the EPA’s
45
enforcement authority.
46
The CAA underwent two major amendments in 1977 and 1990. The 1977
amendments contained minor adjustments to the 1970 version, but in 1990, with
the ambitions of its drafters still unrealized after two decades, Congress
47
overhauled the CAA. That sprawling legislation passed totaled over 800 pages,
dwarfing the less than fifty pages taken up by the original CAA twenty years
48
before. To address continued problems with ambient air quality, the CAA
amendments created more robust requirements for the attainment of the
49
previously established Ambient Air Quality Standards. In addition, the 1990
amendments created a new program to control nearly 200 toxic pollutants and
another program to eliminate chemicals that contributed to stratospheric ozone
50
layer depletion. The EPA tested the limits of its authority under the CAA when
51
it attempted to regulate greenhouse gases in 2014.

42. See id. at 10–11 (discussing President Nixon’s emphasis on “viewing the environment as a whole.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Clean Air Act: 40th Anniversary of the Clean Air Act, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/40th.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
44. See Lewis, supra note 35 (discussing the passage of the Clean Air Act).
45. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 108, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
46. History of the Clean Air Act, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
air/caa/amendments.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. Id. (“[T]he 1977 amendments primarily concerned provisions for the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) of air quality in areas attaining the [National Ambient Air Quality Standards]”). See
William Reilly, The New Clean Air Act: An Environmental Milestone, 17 EPA J. 2, 3 (1991) (noting the history
of amendments to the CAA).
48. Reilly, supra note 47, at 3.
49. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
50. Id. at § 103.
51. See Util. Air Regulatory Group v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2431 (2014) (discussing the
actions of the EPA that plaintiffs challenged in Utility Air).
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C. The Limits of Greenhouse Gas Regulation: Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
Environmental Protection Agency
In response to congressional inaction, the EPA took unprecedented steps by
52
attempting to regulate carbon emissions under the CAA. The worsening
environmental problems that plagued the years leading up to the 1990 CAA
amendments, such as ozone depletion and air pollution, manifested themselves
53
with visible effects, including thick smog layers in cities like Los Angeles.
Currently, global warming and the resultant climate changes represent the most
54
prevalent issues. With Congress light years from any kind of meaningful
legislative action, the EPA declared carbon dioxide to be an atmospheric
pollutant under the CAA and began to regulate greenhouse gas emitters under the
55
existing regulatory scheme.
After the EPA proposed the new regulations—which included subjecting
stationary emitters of greenhouse gases like power plants to established
permitting requirements—several of the affected emitters sued the EPA alleging
56
that the agency had exceeded the bounds of its authority. The Supreme Court
ruled that while some of the EPA’s new regulations—including its permitting
57
requirements—exceeded its authority under the CAA, others had not. The
holding specified that the EPA had not exceeded its authority in requiring those
emitters already subject to permitting to implement Best Available Control
58
Technology (BACT) to control greenhouse gas emissions.
59
Utility Air Regulatory Group represented a victory for the EPA. Justice
60
Scalia declared that the EPA got “almost everything it wanted in [the] case.”
Indeed, the EPA sought to control greenhouse gas emissions from stationary
facilities, and as Scalia noted, it retained the authority to regulate eighty-three
61
percent of those emissions. However, while Scalia’s rosy view of the outcome

52. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, With Some Limits,
THE WASH. POST, June 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-limits-epas-ability-toregulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2431 (discussing the
challenged actions of the EPA).
53. See Reilly, supra note 47, at 3 (discussing pollution issues, including smog and carbon monoxide, in
Southern California).
54. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7 (discussing the potentially severe and irreversible effects of climate
change).
55. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2431.
56. Id. at 2432 (holding that the EPA could implement carbon permitting requirements over those
stationary emitters which they already regulated for different chemical emissions, but not over those who had
not been subject to any prior permitting requirements).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Barnes, supra note 52.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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for the EPA is mathematically sound, it fails to take into account the type of
62
regulation that is permissible under Utility Air Regulatory Group. BACT does
not impose a hard cap on emissions and cannot be used to condemn existing
facilities—this regulatory power applies only to the use of controls on emissions
63
emanating from existing facilities. In addition, the EPA remains unable to
regulate nearly a fifth of existing stationary emitters using their existing authority
under the CAA, and with congressional deliberation continuing to emulate an
indecisive tortoise, those sources of greenhouse gases are in little danger of being
64
subjected to any new regulation in the near future.
III. THE MODEL: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE ENDLESS
STRUGGLE WITH CHAOS
This section will first discuss the formation, powers, and organization of the
Federal Reserve. It will then examine the degree of the Federal Reserve’s success
in combating the challenges presented by a chaotic system—namely, the
economy.
A. The Formation, Powers, and Organization of the Federal Reserve
This subsection will discuss three topics: the formation of the Federal
Reserve, the authority Congress granted it, and its organization.
1. The Formation of the Federal Reserve
The global climate is not the first chaotic system the United States has sought
65
to regulate. The debate over how to best manage the nation’s economy began at
its founding with Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson arguing
66
vociferously over the wisdom of a national bank. Hamilton’s eventual victory
resulted in the creation of the first of several iterations of a United States national
bank—a tool for economic regulation that Congress and various presidents
67
changed, dissolved, and reconstituted over the course of the next century.

62. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2432 (ruling on the types of permissible carbon emission regulation
under the CAA).
63. Id. at 2431.
64. See Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, supra note 22 (discussing the slow pace of congressional
deliberation on the issue of climate change).
65. History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23.
66. Elise Stevens Wilson, The Battle Over the Bank: Hamilton v. Jefferson, THE GILDER LEHRMAN
INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN HISTORY, http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/age-jefferson-and-madison/
resources/battle-over-bank-hamilton-v-jefferson (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
67. See History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (discussing the changes made to the central
banking system).
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The fluctuating means with which the country exerted control over the
economy worked with a measured degree of success until the second half of the
68
nineteenth century. At that point, with the country expanding to the west and
rapidly industrializing in the east, economic volatility spiked and the United
States suffered through a series of economic panics—mini-recessions that felt far
69
from miniature to those who endured them. As the twentieth century began,
70
Congress realized that a more permanent, stable solution was needed. That
solution came when Congress enacted the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 and
71
established the Federal Reserve.
2. The Powers of the Federal Reserve
The aforementioned Federal Reserve Act established the Federal Reserve to
72
control monetary policy in the United States. The bill’s stated purpose was to
“establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States,” and in
pursuit of this goal, it authorized the Federal Reserve Board to actively issue and
73
retire Federal Reserve notes. Congress tasked the Board with using this power
to manage inflation and keep a stable currency environment in the United
74
States. Congress also made the Federal Reserve a “lender of last resort,” meant
75
to provide liquidity during periods of economic contraction.
In 1977, Congress entrusted the Federal Reserve with a new mission: to
“maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate
with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long76
term interest rates.” This expanded purpose effectively placed the welfare of
key economic indicators—unemployment, inflation, and interest rates—in the
77
hands of the Federal Reserve Board and its subsidiary banks. The 1977
legislation does not preclude Congress from taking additional legislative action to
intervene in Federal Reserve policies; indeed, Congress did just that when it
passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 during the depths of
78
the most recent financial crisis. However, the congressional expansion of
68. See id. (discussing the history of central banking in the United States).
69. See id. (discussing the economic volatility of the second half of the nineteenth century).
70. See id. (discussing the problems facing the national economy in the years leading up to the Federal
Reserve Act).
71. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 1, 138 Stat. 251 (1913).
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 13.
74. Id.
75. Gary Richardson, The Great Depression, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY, http://www.federalreserve
history.org/Period/Essay/10 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1977).
77. See id. (tasking the Federal Reserve with additional responsibilities).
78. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
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Federal Reserve power in 1977 allowed the organization to react flexibly to
economic fluctuation with a wide range of tools in order to promote economic
79
stability and health in the United States.
3. The Organization of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve Act primarily created the Federal Reserve Banks—
80
twelve banks that would serve as the outposts of the central banking system. An
extensive discussion of the functionality of the individual Federal Reserve Banks
is beyond the scope of this Comment as this Comment does not advocate
81
structuring the EPA into regional policy divisions. The group assigned to
oversee the twelve banks plays a more important role in the future envisioned for
82
the EPA—the Federal Reserve Board.
83
Seven members make up the Federal Reserve Board. Two of these members
must be the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, and
84
the President appoints and the Senate confirms the remaining five members.
The Federal Reserve Act designed the appointments so that each Presidential
85
appointee serves a single fourteen-year term. The length of these terms reflects
86
a desire to foster a degree of political independence for Board members. The
87
Federal Reserve Act laid out additional requirements for Board members. The
Act requires that at least two of the presidential appointees have a background in
88
finance or banking. However, the Board is not intended to be a group of
bankers; the appointees are meant to represent a broad swath of commercial,
89
agricultural, and industrial interests that span the breadth of the country.
Additionally, no Board member may hold any form of employment with a bank
90
during their term or hold stock in any financial institution. These requirements
are designed to ensure that the members of the Federal Reserve Board have the
financial acumen to effectively govern the nation’s monetary policy while
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (discussing the new authority of the Federal Reserve).
80. History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23.
81. See Part I, supra (defining the purpose of this Comment).
82. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 10–11, 138 Stat. 251 (1913) (discussing the formation
of the Federal Reserve Board).
83. Id. at § 10.
84. Id. at § 10.
85. 12 U.S.C.A. § 241 (2015).
86. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (Nov.
2008), http://newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed46.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
87. See Federal Reserve Act §10 (discussing the qualification requirements for members of the Federal
Reserve Board).
88. Id.
89. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 86.
90. See Federal Reserve Act §10 (“The five members of the Federal Reserve Board . . . shall devote their
entire time to the business of the Federal Reserve Board.”).
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attempting to stave off the specter of corrupt bank officials using Federal Reserve
91
appointments for personal benefit.
B. The Federal Reserve’s Record Against Chaos
While the mission of promoting economic health and long-term stability
evokes optimism, some critics have questioned how successful the Federal
92
Reserve has been since its inception. Critics note that the Federal Reserve has
failed to limit inflation, especially when compared with inflation levels in the
93
decades before its inception. These skeptics also point to other economic
indicators to show what they believe to be the general failure of the Federal
94
Reserve to achieve its mission.
An in-depth analysis of the economic nuances of the Federal Reserve’s
record is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, because of its use as a
model for the future of the EPA, some analysis of the Federal Reserve’s success
95
in combating economic crises is necessary. The Federal Reserve’s first
opportunity to confront a major economic crisis proved to be the greatest failure
96
in its history. The Great Depression was the greatest economic disaster in
American history, and the Federal Reserve exacerbated the situation through a
97
series of poor policy choices. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke admitted in a 2002 speech, “[r]egarding the Great Depression, . . . we
98
did it. We’re very sorry . . . [and] we won’t do it again.” The Federal Reserve’s
failure in reacting to the Great Depression was one of mistaken policy rather than
99
inaction. First, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in 1928, 1929, and 1931,
which created disastrous results in an already contracting credit market. Second,

91. See id. (discussing the requirements to be a member of the Federal Reserve Board).
92. See generally George Selgin, William Lastrapes & Lawrence White, Has the Fed Been a Failure?,
CATO INSTITUTE (Nov./Dec. 2012), http://www.cato.org/policy-report/novemberdecember-2012/has-fed-beenfailure (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (criticizing the record of the Federal Reserve).
93. Id. From 1790 to 1913, the purchasing power of the dollar decreased by only eight percent, whereas
from 1913 to 2012, it increased by over 2,000 percent. Id.
94. See id. (discussing perceived policy failures of the Federal Reserve).
95. See supra Part IV (discussing the use of the Federal Reserve as a model for a more dynamic EPA).
96. See Richardson, supra note 75 (discussing the actions of the Federal Reserve in relation to the Great
Depression).
97. Id.
98. Ben Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Board, Remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman:
On Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday (Nov. 8, 2002) (transcript on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
99. David C. Wheelock, Monetary Policy in the Great Depression: What the Fed Did, and Why, 74 FED.
RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 3, 27 (1992), available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/
review/92/03/Depression_Mar_Apr1992.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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it refused to act as a “lender of last resort,” further constricting the liquidity of the
100
economy as a whole.
While those decisions were incontrovertibly disastrous, they were policy
101
failures rather than institutional ones. They were not the result of an inability to
effect change in the face of a crisis; rather, they represented the flaws of the
misguided economic philosophy of President Hoover’s Secretary of the Treasury,
102
Andrew Mellon. As such, the failures of the Federal Reserve leading up to and
during the Great Depression do not indicate the organization’s inability to react
to and regulate a chaotic system—instead, they represent isolated policy failures
103
to which any organ of government is prone.
104
As the Federal Reserve matured, its responses to crises improved. This was
105
particularly true in the years following the 1977 expansion of its purview. The
congressional decision to give the Federal Reserve broad discretion and
flexibility allowed the organization to react effectively to the volatility and
106
oscillations characteristic of a chaotic system like the economy. The Federal
107
Reserve has had several crucial occasions to exert its influence. It provided
much-needed liquidity during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the late 1980s,
108
keeping the minor crisis from becoming something more serious. In the wake
of the September 12, 2001 attacks, the Federal Reserve announced that it would
remain open and provide credit and capital to the American economy, helping to
109
stem the stock market sell-off that had begun. Finally, the Federal Reserve
began a series of transactions with troubled financial institutions in the early
110
2000s at the outset of the subprime mortgage crisis. This action proved to be
the opening steps of a widespread governmental response that culminated in the
111
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. While the Federal Reserve’s actions

100. See Richardson, supra note 75 (stating that the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in 1928 and
1929 and repeated this mistake again in 1931 in response to the international financial crisis).
101. See id. (discussing the failed policies that exacerbated the Great Depression); but see id. (noting that
the “decision-making structure was decentralized and often ineffective.”).
102. See id. (arguing that one of the Federal Reserve’s initial failures was its increase in interest rates
during the Great Depression); Andrew W. Mellon, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY, http://www.federal
reservehistory.org/People/DetailView/244 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that
Mellon, as a member of the Federal Reserve, “favored interest rate hikes”).
103. See Richardson, supra note 75 (noting that the Federal Reserve’s contribution to the Great
Depression was the result of failed economic policies).
104. See generally History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (providing a timeline of financial crises
and the Federal Reserves’ respective responses).
105. Id.
106. 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1977); FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1.
107. See History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (noting that trading continued one day after the
stock market crashed on October 19, 1987).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
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were not the only factor, the period following the 1977 expansion of its mission
112
witnessed “the longest peacetime economic expansion” in American history.
Volatility is unavoidable in a chaotic system, but the flexibility and broad
empowerment afforded to the Federal Reserve in 1977 allows the organization to
113
effectively combat the symptoms of economic chaos.
IV. THE VISION: USING THE FEDERAL RESERVE AS A MODEL FOR A
REINVIGORATED EPA
This section discusses the benefits of using the organizational structure and
broad empowerment of the Federal Reserve as a model for a new, dynamic EPA
that serves as the primary creator of climate change policy for the United
114
States.
A. Starting at the Top: Creating an EPA Board to Oversee Climate Change
Policy in the United States
This section will examine two key benefits of creating an EPA board
modeled after the Federal Reserve Board: allowing environmental experts to
make key policy decisions and reducing gridlock in the decision-making process.
1. The Right Stuff: Trusting Experts with Key Policy Decisions
Appointing experts in finance and economics is one of the cornerstones of
115
the success of the Federal Reserve. The requirement that the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, and two appointees with backgrounds
in finance and economics serve on the Federal Reserve Board clearly reflects a
congressional desire to entrust critical policy decisions to those who are best
116
suited to make them. Congress understood, both in 1913 and later on in 1977,
that allowing great financial and economic minds to craft monetary policy would
be vastly preferable to having members of Congress—elected, but with many
117
having no particular expertise in the field—make these decisions.

112. History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23.
113. See id. (discussing the Federal Reserve’s responses to numerous financial crises); see also supra text
accompanying notes 76–77 (discussing the expanded power granted to the Federal Reserve in 1977).
114. Supra Part IV.A–C.
115. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 10, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (explaining the requirement
that the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, and two appointees with a background in
finance serve on the Federal Reserve Board).
116. See id. (ensuring that at least four of the seven members would have experience in economics or
finance).
117. See id. (requiring that board members be experienced in finance and banking and inferring that
Congress found these people to be more qualified to make decisions regarding monetary policy).
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Whatever the educational makeup of the Congress that passed the Federal
118
Reserve Act, the contemporary Congress is not filled with science experts. A
mere eight percent of Congressmembers majored in any sort of science in
119
college, and fewer still are experts in environmental science. The number of
Congressmembers that do not acknowledge either the existence of climate
120
change or its anthropogeneity reflects this lack of expertise. More than half of
Republican members of the House of Representatives in the 113th Congress
either denied the existence of climate change or denied that humans are causing
121
it.
While congressional skepticism in the face of overwhelming scientific
evidence is alarming, it is not in and of itself the main reason that this Comment
122
suggests empaneling experts to make policy decisions. Many of those who
recognize the imminent nature of the climate change problem have sought
solutions that, while well meaning, lack the expertise necessary to create long123
term answers for promoting stability in a chaotic system like the global climate.
The realization that experts are simply better equipped to attempt to regulate
complex systems, like the environment and the economy, led Congress to create
124
the Federal Reserve in 1913. All the benefits realized by leaving monetary
policy to experts would translate to empowering experts to answer the complex
125
questions involved in combating climate change.
2. Strength in Small Numbers: Reacting Nimbly to Crises
126

The Federal Reserve Board’s small size also contributes to its success.
Some of the organization’s best moments have resulted from quick and decisive
127
action in moments of crisis. The Federal Reserve’s hair-trigger responses

118. See THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, HUMANITIES REPORT CARD 2013 (2013),
available at http://www.humanitiesindicators.org/images/humanitiesReportCard/2013/Factoid_5.pdf [hereinafter
HUMANITIES REPORT CARD 2013] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that eight
percent of Congress members pursued undergraduate science degrees).
119. Id.
120. Spross & Koronowski, supra note 15 (“Over 56 percent—133 members—of the current Republican
caucus in the House of Representatives deny the basic tenets of climate science.”).
121. Id.
122. See id. (discussing Congress members who do not believe in climate change).
123. See FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the complexity of systems like the global
climate).
124. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 10, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (empaneling finance and
banking experts to manage monetary policy in the United States).
125. See History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (noting several of the successes of the Federal
Reserve).
126. See generally id. (discussing the successes of the Federal Reserve); see also supra text
accompanying note 83 (discussing the size of the Federal Reserve).
127. See id. at 6 (noting the successes during the Savings and Loan crisis and in the aftermath of
September 11).
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during situations like the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s and the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001 helped maintain a greater degree of stability
128
than would otherwise have been possible.
The climate change crisis is entirely different from the lightning-quick
changes characteristic of the economic panics that Congress designed the Federal
129
Reserve to combat. While climate change will continue to span decades,
130
economic crises can begin and end in hours. Still, while environmental crises
131
may develop slowly, they can still necessitate swift and decisive action. During
the 1970s, it became clear that chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
132
were damaging the stratospheric ozone layer. In the 1980s, it was announced
that the damage to the ozone layer would be significant if the world continued to
133
use the chemicals. Even after further investigation revealed that the damage
was more significant than originally thought, it took until 1996 for governments
134
in developing countries to finally phase out CFCs. Global cooperative efforts
averted the crisis after significant ozone depletion; it appears that natural
135
atmospheric process will restore the ozone layer in the next fifty years.
While CFCs did not cause permanent damage, the United States’ failure to
cobble together an adequate response to the crisis for a full twenty years after it
136
became apparent that the chemicals were dangerous is alarming. As the dangers
of climate change have become clearer and more imminent, the congressional
137
response has taken the same torpid pace. While Congress has been unable to
come to anything resembling a consensus on how to address the problem, a
smaller body resembling the Federal Reserve Board would have a much greater
138
chance of reaching an agreement. Despite the differentiated pacing of
environmental and economic problems, the benefits of quick and decisive action

128. History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23.
129. See generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3 (depicting the slow but inexorable nature of the
climate change crisis); see also History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (describing nineteenth century
economic panics).
130. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3 (illustrating the chronological scope of the climate change
issue); see Richardson, supra note 75 (describing the stock market crash).
131. See also Ozone Science: The Facts Behind the Phaseout, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ozone/science/sc_fact.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2010) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (discussing the chlorofluorocarbon ozone crisis).
132. Id.
133. See id. (stating that measurements showed the ozone layer had been damaged more than expected
and inferring that such action would continue if action was not taken to reduce CFCs).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 131–35 (discussing the United States’ delayed response
as well as the possibility of the ozone’s natural healing after five decades).
137. Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, supra note 22.
138. Id.; see History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (noting the quick action taken by the Federal
Reserve Board on several occasions).
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139

remain applicable to both. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
has emphasized, the global climate system is nearing a point of no return—quick
140
and decisive action is exactly what is needed now.
B. Loading the Guns: Arming the New EPA for the Struggle with Chaos
This section discusses the benefits of empowering the EPA in a manner
analogous to the Federal Reserve and proposes basic logistical means for doing
so.
1. The Benefits of the New Board
The organization of the Federal Reserve Board allows it to react quickly to
the crises that inevitably pop up in a chaotic system, but its responses would be
141
impotent without a versatile problem-solving arsenal. The organization’s
authority to set interest rates, control currency circulation, and regulate its
142
lending flow allows it to attack problems in a variety of ways. Even with its
nimble organization, if the Federal Reserve Board had to consult with Congress
each time it came upon a new problem for the authority to deal with it, the
143
organization would be rendered completely ineffective.
144
As the climate change problem has what the IPCC terms “tipping points,”
congressional inaction and the Court’s ruling in Utility Air have hamstrung the
145
EPA’s efforts to play a mitigating role. With legislative gridlock grinding ever
closer to a total halt, the EPA tried to use the only weapon it had—its authority
146
under the Clean Air Act. While the Court did not entirely condemn the
agency’s effort to put the decades-old legislation to new use, it did set clear limits
147
on the EPA’s power to regulate carbon emissions. The Court left the EPA with
a near-empty quiver with which to combat the growing effects of climate
148
change.
139. See Ozone Science: The Facts Behind the Phaseout, supra note 131 (discussing the damage that
resulted from the United States’ failure to respond to the ozone crisis).
140. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8.
141. See History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (describing the Federal Reserve’s responses to
various crises).
142. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 11, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (enumerating the powers of
the Federal Reserve); see also 12 U.S.C. §225(a) (1977) (describing the authority given to the Federal Reserve).
143. See Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, supra note 22 (noting the intractability of congressional
deliberation and the body’s inability to make decisions).
144. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 128.
145. Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, supra note 22; see Util. Air Regulatory Group v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (holding that the EPA can regulate only some stationary carbon
emissions).
146. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2435 (discussing the actions taken by the EPA).
147. Id. at 2449.
148. See id. (limiting the EPA’s ability to regulate carbon emitters).

16

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
If Congress tasked the EPA with a mission statement similar to the one it
gave the Federal Reserve in 1977—to promote long-term climate stability—and
gave the EPA full regulatory authority over emissions to create such stability,
Congress would create a new and improved EPA with the power to steer the
world away from the climatic cliff it has been careening towards for the past
149
hundred years. However, Congress should go further than to empower the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gases: it should give the EPA both the authority and the
mandate to regulate any new pollutants that will affect climate stability in the
150
future.
Congress did not create the Federal Reserve to deal with an individual
151
economic panic. It created the Federal Reserve as a permanent solution that
152
would help promote economic stability. In contrast, Congress established the
153
EPA to combat the growing problem of pollution. NEPA and the CAA aimed
to minimize pollution to improve environmental quality and promote human
154
health. The drafters could not have contemplated global climate change at the
155
time of that legislation. Climate change is a new and infinitely more intricate
156
problem that requires a more dynamic solution.
Congress established the Federal Reserve as a dynamic, long-term solution to
157
both the problems of 1913 and those that were yet to come. The solution could
adapt to the volatility inherent in a chaotic system; it could adapt to new and
158
unforeseeable problems that could possibly stem from solutions to old ones.
That volatility, and the certainty that new and unforeseeable problems will follow
this one, is the reason why Congress should empower the EPA to go beyond the
159
problem of greenhouse gas emissions. The EPA should be a dynamic force for
long-term climatic stability so that when carbon emissions have been curtailed
and global climate catastrophe has been averted, the agency can turn its eyes
forward and ensure that the world never approaches a climatic point of no return
160
again.

149. 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1977).
150. See also FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the drastic effects that changes can have
in complex systems).
151. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
152. See id.
153. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
154. Lewis, supra note 35.
155. See id. (discussing the problems that led to the EPA’s creation).
156. See generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3–8 (noting the intricacies of climate change).
157. Federal Reserve Act pmbl.
158. See supra Part III (discussing the ability of the Federal Reserve to manage a chaotic system).
159. See FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (noting that changes can create extremely unpredictable
results in chaotic systems like the environment).
160. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the imminence of the climate change threat); see
also FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the inevitability of volatility in a complex system).
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2. Logistics: Putting the Board Together and Empowering It to Battle
Chaos
The reorganized EPA this Comment proposes will mirror the governance
161
structure of the Federal Reserve Board. The decision to make the Federal
Reserve Board consist of seven members allows the Board to represent a wide
array of policy interests while remaining small enough to be a nimble and
162
decisive body. Modeling the structure of the proposed EPA Board on the
163
Federal Reserve Board would promote these same values. Adapting the Federal
Reserve Act requirement that at least two of the Board appointees have a
background in banking and finance to requiring a background in environmental
law would ensure that the new EPA Board members have the benefit of scientific
164
expertise. In addition, ensuring that the Board members represent a variety of
interests beyond pure environmentalism would allay the fears of many whose
economic priorities outweigh their environmental concerns and represent a check
on the new EPA Board’s implementation of environmental policies that could
165
create major negative economic consequences.
A failure to provide sufficient discretionary authority would hamstring the
new EPA Board and leave it as powerless to effect real change as the current
166
EPA. The key, then, to enabling this new EPA governance structure to have a
legitimate impact on the environment beyond the current crisis of climate change
will be to task it with a mission statement similar to the one given to the Federal
167
Reserve in 1970 and to empower it to carry out that mission. The global climate
system presents challenges that are greater in both scope and complexity than the
global economy; while both are prime examples of chaotic systems, the scale of
the climate system and the broad range of variables affecting it render the
168
challenge of regulating it much more daunting.
The nature of chaotic systems suggests that it is a near certainty that
anthropogenic climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions will not be

161. See Federal Reserve Act § 10 (detailing the structure of the Federal Reserve Board).
162. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 86.
163. See id. (discussing the desire for the Federal Reserve Board to reflect a variety of political and
economic interests).
164. See Federal Reserve Act § 10 (requiring that at least two of the President’s appointees to the Federal
Reserve Board have experience in finance or banking).
165. See Brian Bennett, Marco Rubio Says Human Activity Isn’t Causing Climate Change, L.A. TIMES
(May 11, 2014, 11:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-rubio-denies-climatechange-20140511-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting Senator Rubio’s
concerns that environmental reform could have major economic consequences).
166. See Util. Air Regulatory Group v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (holding that
the EPA lacked authority under the CAA to regulate some sources of greenhouse gas emissions).
167. See 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1977) (entrusting the Federal Reserve with promoting economic stability
through monetary policy).
168. See generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the scale of the climate change crisis).
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169

the final climatic crisis. However, given the challenges inherent in predicting
170
long-term climatic behavior, it is impossible to say what the next crisis will be.
As such, the task of empowering an agency to tackle enigmatic future crises
171
presents substantial difficulties. Given the absence of a crystal ball, the three
172
major atmospheric crises of the last half-century may prove to be instructive.
Over the last fifty years, the United States has grappled with three primary
atmospheric crises: air pollution in the 1960s and 1970s, tropospheric ozone
173
depletion in the 1980s, and anthropogenic climate change in the 21st century.
174
These three crises share a common cause: chemical emissions. The CAA gave
the EPA authority to regulate a wide range of air-polluting chemicals in 1970,
175
and Congress acted independently to ban CFCs in response to the ozone crisis.
Both the EPA and Congress have taken baby steps to limit the greenhouse gas
emissions that caused the current crisis, but the greater part of the work remains
176
unfinished. In order to empower the new EPA Board to respond to climatic
crises that stem in large part from chemical emissions, Congress should give the
new EPA authority to regulate all chemical emissions in the United States in
177
order to maintain climatic stability for both current and future generations.
C. Making It Happen: The Challenge of Implementing Environmental Reform in
a Hostile Legislative Climate
Despite the attraction of appointing a group of brilliant scientists to save the
world from the sins of industrialization and to stand ready to handle whatever
counterstroke arises from the rescue, there lies a counterintuitivity in writing on
the necessity of congressional action to save the environment from congressional
178
inaction. Congress has not approached an agreement on any kind of climate

169. See FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the challenges of chaotic systems).
170. See id. (noting the unpredictability of chaotic systems).
171. See id. (expounding on the inherent unpredictability of chaos theory).
172. See Lewis, supra note 35 (discussing the air pollution problems of the 1960s); see also Ozone
Science: The Facts Behind the Phaseout, supra note 131 (discussing the challenges of the ozone depletion
crisis); see generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–4 (discussing the climate change issue).
173. See Lewis, supra note 35 (discussing the air pollution problems of the 1960s); see also Ozone
Science: The Facts Behind the Phaseout, supra note 131 (discussing the challenges of the ozone depletion
crisis); see generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–6 (discussing the climate change issue).
174. See supra notes 171–72.
175. See Lewis, supra note 35 (discussing the air pollution problems of the 1960s); see also Ozone
Science: The Facts Behind the Phaseout, supra note 131 (discussing the challenges of the ozone depletion
crisis).
176. Util. Air Regulatory Group v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014); ALLEN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 4–4.
177. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the imminence of the long-term consequences of
the climate change crisis).
178. See Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, supra note 22 (discussing congressional inaction).
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change legislation; it could be called the worst sort of optimism to think that they
179
would now create a revamped and reorganized EPA.
Congressional hostility towards environmental science manifested itself in
the EPA Advisory Board Reform Act of 2013, which passed in the House in
180
November 2014. The bill purports to “reform” the EPA Advisory Board to
consist of a group of appointed members that advise the EPA Administrator on
181
scientific issues. In an apparent effort to remove biased individuals from
consideration, the bill prohibits scientists who have written peer-reviewed work
on pertinent scientific subjects from serving on the Board while explicitly
permitting individuals with corporate conflicts of interest to serve as long as
182
those conflicts are disclosed. This disclosure requirement furthers the supposed
goal of “transparency” that House Republicans have indicated the bill seeks to
183
achieve.
Critics of the bill include the Union of Concerned Scientists, which stated
that the bill’s provisions “turn[] the idea of conflict of interest on its head, with
the bizarre presumption that corporate experts with direct financial interests are
184
not conflicted while academics who work on these issues are.” One House
Democrat put it “more blunt[ly], telling House Republicans . . . ‘I get it, you
don’t like science. And you don’t like science that interferes with the interests of
your corporate clients. But we need science to protect public health and the
185
environment.’” It is unclear whether this bill will pass in the Senate, and the
White House has already issued a statement vowing to issue a veto if it does pass
186
the second house of the legislature. The bill did not secure a two-thirds
majority in the house, so an override of a hypothetical veto is exceedingly
187
unlikely. Still, the support of a provision so hostile to expert involvement in
environmental policy making is troubling given that empowering experts to
188
formulate environmental policy is exactly what this Comment suggests.
The Republican victory in the 2014 midterm elections exacerbated the
obstacles to meaningful climate change legislation by reinforcing the opponents

179. Id.
180. H.R. 1422 (113th): EPA Science Advisory Board Reform Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1422 [hereinafter H.R. 1422] (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
181. EPA Science Advisory Board Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1422, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014).
182. Id. at § 2(b).
183. Beverly Mitchell, House Passes Bill that Prohibits Expert Scientific Advice to the EPA, INHABITAT
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://inhabitat.com/house-passes-bill-that-prohibits-expert-scientific-advice-to-the-epa/ (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
184. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. H.R. 1422, supra note 180.
188. See supra Part I.
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189

of climate reform in Congress. Since the swearing in of the 114th Congress,
far-right Senator Ted Cruz, who has denied the existence of climate change,
became the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Space, Science, and
190
Competitiveness. Cruz’s fellow GOP member Senator Marco Rubio will now
oversee the Senate subcommittee that governs the National Oceanic and
191
Atmospheric Administration. While Rubio has conceded the existence of
192
climate change, he remains convinced that human activity is not causing it.
While it is clear that the current Congress is unlikely to support anything
resembling pro-environmental legislation, the focus of this Comment is in line
with the proposal it sets forth for the EPA: a long-term solution that looks beyond
193
the isolated problem of climate change. According to the world’s leading
194
environmental scientists, the global climate is approaching a tipping point. Still,
vainly hoping for a new paradigm of environmental policy from a congressional
195
majority that regards the issue with far less concern is futile. The true power of
the solution this Comment suggests will not be mitigated by a delay in its
implementation. While the passage of time will make the task of the new EPA
more difficult, this solution is aimed at more than just the problem of climate
196
change. This vision for a reinvigorated EPA is predicated on the idea that
197
global climate change is not the last climatic problem that humanity will face.
Chaos theory indicates that small changes to the global climate will instigate
larger ones, and a massive reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is far from a
198
small change. It is impossible to foresee what the next great environmental
challenge will be; the only thing that is certain is that this is not the last mountain
199
that the global community will have to climb. A postponement of a few years
will not affect the far-reaching nature of this solution; the fact that this Congress
200
is unlikely to implement it will not eliminate its ultimate usefulness.

189. See Dan Hirschhorn, Republicans Win the Senate in Midterm Elections, TIME (Nov. 5, 2014, 7:39
AM),
http://time.com/3556003/election-day-midterm-2014-republicans-senate-democrats-obama-mcconnell/
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that Republicans now control both chambers of
Congress).
190. Colin Lecher, Senator Ted Cruz Appointed to Oversee NASA In Congress, THE VERGE (Jan. 11,
2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/11/7528337/senator-ted-cruz-nasa-subcommittee (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
191. Id.
192. Bennett, supra note 165.
193. See Mitchell, supra note 183 (noting the anti-environmental character of the Congress’ actions).
194. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the potential irreversibility of harm caused by
greenhouse emissions).
195. See Mitchell, supra note 183 (detailing Congress’ hostility to pro-environmental policy).
196. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (noting the long-lasting effects of climate change); supra Part I.
197. See supra Part IV (discussing the vision for the new EPA and the focus on empowering it to address
not just this problem, but the ones that arise after it gets solved).
198. FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1.
199. See id. (discussing the unpredictability of chaotic systems like the environment).
200. See Mitchell, supra note 183 (noting the GOP hostility to pro-environmental legislation).
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Additionally, a more politically neutral Congress could theoretically enact
201
this solution more easily. The actual changes this Comment suggests offer
202
Congress what amounts to an elegant punt. To implement it, Congress would
203
not have to decide on an actual course of environmental policy. The houses of
Congress can disagree on environmental policy to their heart’s content. While
this Comment advocates taking an approach to climate change, it does not
204
presume to offer a scientific solution. Instead, this Comment suggests that
Congress delegate the problem to a small group of individuals with more
collective knowledge on the topic than the 535 members of Congress
205
combined. The Senate would retain the ability to approve any of the President’s
appointees, and Congress would not be precluded from passing any sort of
206
environmental policy measure in the future. Congress should do what it did in
1913—it should empower experts in the field to battle a chaotic system that the
207
legislative branch is simply not equipped to handle on its own.
V. CONCLUSION
Science inherently lacks certainty, and the specter of utter unpredictability
grows more intimidating in the context of the amorphous science of chaos
208
209
theory. That inherent uncertainty hinders decisiveness and impairs action.
Part of what makes the empowerment of experts so necessary is the
210
unpredictability of global climate change. If a change as small as a butterfly
flapping its wings can create drastic changes, what titanic shifts will attempting
211
to reverse global climatic trends create?
212
The effects of chaos theory are readily apparent in the global economy.
Recognizing its inability to react quickly and decisively to increasing economic

201. See supra text accompanying notes 15–16 (discussing Congress’ failure to uniformly recognize the
issue of climate change and subsequently determine a solution).
202. See supra Part IV (offering a solution to the issue of climate change).
203. See supra Part IV (arguing that the EPA’s authority should be expanded and that Congress should
model the organization after the Federal Reserve).
204. See supra Part I (suggesting a solution to climate change by reorganizing the EPA).
205. See HUMANITIES REPORT CARD 2013 supra note 118 (indicating the scientific illiteracy of a
stunning number of Congresspeople).
206. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 10, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (laying out the advice and
consent principle that would be used to appoint EPA board members).
207. See id. (establishing the Federal Reserve and creating the Federal Reserve Board).
208. FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1.
209. See Glacial Pacing in the Halls of Congress, supra note 22 (discussing congressional inaction); see
also Spross & Koronowski, supra note 15 (discussing how many members of Congress question whether
climate change is real).
210. See supra Part I (discussing the unpredictability of the global climate).
211. See FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the butterfly effect).
212. See History of the Federal Reserve, supra note 23 (discussing the extreme volatility in the nineteenth
century economy).

22

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
volatility, Congress established the Federal Reserve and entrusted it with broad
213
discretion to manage American monetary policy and minimize volatility. The
considerations that led Congress to establish the Federal Reserve are entirely
214
transferrable to the climate change predicament. The deliberate, measured
nature of the legislative branch provides balance and stability for the federal
government, but managing chaotic systems requires a different, more nimble
215
216
hand. Congress is simply not suited to regulate environmental chaos, and
should reorganize the EPA and empower it to promote stability and lead the
217
world away from the climatic point of no return.

213. See generally Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (establishing the Federal
Reserve).
214. See supra Part IV.
215. FRACTAL FOUNDATION, supra note 1 (discussing the unpredictability of chaotic systems).
216. See HUMANITIES REPORT CARD 2013, supra note 118 (noting the small percentage of
Congressmembers with an educational background in science).
217. Supra PART 1; ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the severity of climate change).
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